Conflict Diamonds and the Kimberley Process
The term conflict diamond is often used in everyday language as a synonym for any diamond associated with injustice. The formal Kimberley Process has a much narrower scope.
Understanding that scope is crucial for two reasons: we must neither diminish what the KPCS actually does nor attribute to it evidence that it was never designed to provide.
The Wars of the 1990s and the Problem of Easily Transferable Value
A diamond has several characteristics that make it suitable for financing armed groups: high value in a small volume, durability, international marketability, and the ability to be smuggled through complex regional networks.
During the wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the broader West African context, the illicit trade in rough diamonds became directly linked to the financing of armed actors.
Angola: UNITA and the Certificate of Origin
Through Resolution 1173 of 1998, the UN Security Council prohibited the import of Angolan diamonds not controlled under the Government of Angola’s official Certificate of Origin regime.
This was an important precursor to the Kimberley Process: the problem was addressed through control of a legitimate rough shipment, not by trying to identify every polished diamond geologically after the fact.
Sierra Leone: From Embargo to System
UN Security Council Resolution 1306 of July 2000 prohibited the direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone, except for goods controlled through an effective government Certificate of Origin regime.
The UN explicitly linked the illicit diamond trade to conflict financing and called for the development of a verifiable system for legal exports.
Liberia and cross-border trade routes further demonstrated the limitation of a national certificate when neighboring jurisdictions do not apply compatible controls.
[VISUAL 100.1: Angola / Sierra Leone / regional flows → the need for an internationally compatible rough-control system]
Kimberley, 2000, and the Formation of the KPCS
In May 2000, representatives of southern African producer countries met in Kimberley to develop a shared response. The process then received support from the United Nations and expanded into an international certification framework.
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was agreed in 2002, and implementation began in 2003.
“Kimberley” therefore does not denote a single organization that controls every diamond in the world; the Kimberley Process is an intergovernmental system whose rules are implemented through the national legislative and customs mechanisms of its participants.
The Formal Definition Is Narrower Than the Everyday Term “Blood Diamond”
The current official KP definition of conflict diamonds refers to rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance armed conflicts aimed at undermining legitimate governments.
That definition contains several important elements:
- rough diamond;
- rebel movement or ally;
- financing armed conflict;
- an objective of undermining a legitimate government.
Therefore, a diamond associated with poor working conditions, corruption, environmental harm, organized crime, or state violence does not automatically fall within the formal KP definition of a conflict diamond.
This does not mean that those problems are less important. It describes the legal and institutional scope.
The KPCS Is a Rough-Diamond System
The most important boundary in this entire chapter is:
The KPCS governs the international trade in rough diamonds.
Participants permit the international trade in rough goods only with other participants that meet the scheme’s requirements, and shipments must be accompanied by the appropriate KP certificate and be in the prescribed sealed/tamper-resistant form under national implementation.
A polished diamond in a retail ring does not have “its own original KP certificate” in the same way as an exported rough shipment.
[VISUAL 100.2: The KP certificate accompanies a rough shipment—not an individual polished stone throughout its entire life]
The Certificate Accompanies the Shipment, Not the Crystal
A single rough shipment may contain a large number of stones. After sorting, cutting, splitting, and combining lots, the physical relationship between one retail stone and the original certificate can become complex.
The KP certificate therefore constitutes shipment-level trade-control evidence, not an individual gemological fingerprint.
This distinction explains why chain of custody, digital provenance, and rough-to-polished matching exist as additional systems.
What the KP Can Establish
Within its own scope, a valid KPCS framework can support the conclusion that an international rough shipment passed through a participant’s official certification regime and was declared compliant with KP rules.
This is significant institutional evidence. But its strength depends on:
- proper national implementation;
- the authenticity of the document;
- the integrity of controls;
- accurate classification of the goods;
- the functioning of peer review and enforcement.
What the KP Does Not Establish
KP compliance covers a precisely defined certification scope; one cannot infer from it:
- the specific mine of an individual polished stone;
- ownership;
- the entire chain of custody after cutting;
- observance of all labor rights;
- absence of corruption;
- environmental sustainability;
- compliance with all international sanctions;
- absence of every form of violence;
- a positive net community impact.
The following evidentiary formula therefore applies:
KP-compliant ≠ universally ethical ≠ mine-traced ≠ sanctions-cleared ≠ environmentally certified.
Current Scope as of August 8, 2026
As of this factual cutoff, the official KP website lists:
- 60 Participants;
- they represent 86 countries, because the European Union and its member states participate as a single participant;
- participants represent approximately 99.8% of global rough-diamond production.
The final figure describes the share of global rough production represented by KP participants; it does not mean that 99.8% of every retail diamond is individually mine-traced.
Reform of the Definition Has Not Yet Been Adopted
During 2025, intensive negotiations took place within the Kimberley Process on expanding the definition of conflict diamond. The Intersessional meeting in May produced progress toward a possible compromise, but the Plenary in November 2025 did not achieve the consensus required for a new formal definition.
Therefore, as of August 8, 2026, the controlling text remains the current KP Core Document, with the existing definition focused on rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict against legitimate governments. Discussion of a broader scope remains open, but a reform proposal is not the same as an adopted rule.
The 2026 KP Plenary is scheduled for November 30–December 4, 2026, in New Delhi. If consensus is reached at that time on the definition or another fundamental amendment to the KPCS, this section must be reverified.
India as 2026 Chair, Ghana as Vice-Chair
In 2026, India chairs the Kimberley Process, and Ghana is Vice-Chair. Under the process’s rules, the Vice-Chair generally assumes the chair the following year, subject to plenary consensus.
The Chair coordinates the process, but is not a “global diamond regulator.” The KP includes working groups, monitoring, statistics, participation review, and a plenary consensus structure.
Statistics and Peer Review
The scheme exchanges rough-production and trade data and uses statistical anomalies, review visits, and other mechanisms to monitor implementation.
Statistics can reveal an illogical trade pattern. A large discrepancy between declared production and exports is a signal for review, but a statistical anomaly does not by itself determine the cause or constitute a finding of smuggling.
Civil Society and Criticism of the Scope
Civil-society organizations have criticized the narrow formal definition of conflict diamond for years, particularly because it does not cover every form of state violence, labor abuse, or other serious problems in mining areas.
Global Witness left the Kimberley Process in 2011, arguing that the scheme no longer provided sufficiently reliable protection against the broader problem of conflict diamonds. Such criticism should be clearly attributed as the organization’s position, while the formal boundary of the definition should be confirmed from the primary KP document.
Criticism of the scope and recognition of the scheme’s historical effect are not mutually exclusive.
The Kimberley Process Is an Important Historical Turning Point
The KPCS created a globally compatible framework in which producer, exporter, and importer states must use the same minimum administrative language concerning the rough trade.
Its greatest contribution is not proof that “every diamond is ethical,” but the establishment of an international mechanism that transformed conflict rough diamonds from an informal political problem into a subject of formal certification and customs controls.
The World Diamond Council System of Warranties Is Not the KPCS
The World Diamond Council developed the System of Warranties — SoW as an industry B2B self-regulation layer that supplements the KPCS.
The SoW is implemented through invoice and memo documents for rough, polished, and diamond-jewelry transactions. The revised SoW of 2021 expanded the statement beyond KPCS compliance alone to responsible business practices related to human and labor rights, anticorruption, and AML principles.
This is more meaningful than the label “conflict-free” alone, but it remains an industry self-regulation framework, not a government KP certificate.
Transition to the Revised SoW in 2026
The WDC established different transition deadlines for the revised SoW. The transition period for rough-diamond sales ended in September 2024, while for polished diamonds and diamond jewelry it ends on September 21, 2026.
As of the book’s factual date—August 8, 2026—that second deadline has not yet arrived. It must therefore not be written as though the transition were already fully complete.
[VISUAL 100.3: KPCS rough-shipment control versus the WDC SoW B2B warranty layer]
Conflict-Free, Responsible, Traceable, and Ethical Are Not Synonyms
Four words describe different questions:
- conflict-free under the KP — relates to the formal rebel-conflict scope;
- traceable — claims that the path of the goods can be tracked through a record;
- responsibly sourced — requires a broader due-diligence framework and a defined standard;
- ethical — an even broader normative term that can become meaningless marketing language without criteria.
Traceability describes the ability to follow goods through the chain; it does not guarantee a good social or environmental outcome. Goods can be tracked very precisely through a chain that still has such problems.
Evidence Ladder for a Responsible-Origin Claim
When a seller says “ethical diamond,” the professional reader asks:
- what precise claim is being made?
- does it concern conflict status, mine origin, custody, labor, environment, sanctions, or all of them?
- which standard or law defines the criterion?
- is the evidence at the individual-stone, lot, shipment, or company level?
- who issued or verified the evidence?
- what are the date and scope of the verification?
- which claims remain outside the scope?
[VISUAL 100.4: Responsible-origin evidence ladder — claim → scope → evidence unit → verifier → limitations]
Chapter Summary
- Conflict diamonds became a global security problem through wars such as those in Angola and Sierra Leone.
- UN certificate-of-origin and embargo regimes from the late 1990s were direct precursors to the broader KPCS model.
- The Kimberley Process began with a political meeting in 2000, the KPCS was shaped in 2002, and implementation began in 2003.
- The formal KP term conflict diamond refers to rough diamonds through which rebel movements or their allies finance conflict against a legitimate government.
- “Blood diamond” in everyday speech can have a broader meaning than the formal KP definition.
- The KPCS is a rough-trade certification scheme, not a lifelong passport for an individual polished stone.
- A KP certificate accompanies a shipment, not every crystal after all transformations.
- KP compliance does not automatically cover the mine, ownership, all labor rights, environmental sustainability, or sanctions compliance.
- As of August 8, 2026, the KP lists 60 Participants representing 86 countries and about 99.8% of global rough production.
- The attempt to expand the formal definition did not achieve consensus at the 2025 Plenary; the existing definition therefore remains controlling until the KP formally adopts a new one.
- India is the 2026 Chair, and Ghana is Vice-Chair.
- Statistics and peer review are important monitoring tools; an anomaly is a signal for review, not evidence of a violation.
- Civil society seriously criticizes the narrow scope of the formal definition; those criticisms must be attributed.
- The KP remains historically significant because it created a globally compatible intergovernmental rough-control regime.
- The WDC System of Warranties is a separate B2B self-regulation layer that extends beyond the KPCS.
- The transition to the revised SoW for polished diamonds and diamond jewelry ends on September 21, 2026, after the book’s factual cutoff.